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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  exploit  lottery-determined  admission  to  dental  school  to  estimate  the  payoffs  to  the  study  of  dentistry
in the  Netherlands.  Using  data  from  up to 22  years  after  the  lottery,  we  find  that  in most  years  after
graduation  dentists  earn  around  50,000  Euros  more  than  they  would  earn  in  their next-best  profession.
The  payoff  is  larger  for men  than  for women  but does  not  vary  with  high  school  GPA. The  large  payoffs
cannot  be  attributed  to  longer  working  hours,  larger  investments  while  studying  (opportunity  costs  and
direct  costs),  or unpleasant  aspects  of  working  as a dentist.  A  plausible  explanation  is  that  dentists  earn
a  monopoly  rent.  Results  from  regressions  of dentists’  earnings  on  dentists  density  are consistent  with
this,  as are  the facts  that  the  supply  of dentists  in the Netherlands  is  low  and  that  the payoff  does not
vary with  high  school  GPA.






Governments in many countries limit the number of people
orking in the medical sector. This is often achieved by restricting
ccess to medical training places. Arguments to restrict supply
re that training people for medical professions is costly and that
dditional supply may  create its own demand.1 To avoid that
educed supply translates into excessive rents for medical profes-
ionals, many governments regulate the prices that can be charged
or medical services. It is, however, hard to assess whether the
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1 Gottschalk et al. (2018) document a recent example of supplier-induced demand
mong 180 dentists in Switzerland, of whom 28% recommend treatment to a patient
ho  does not need treatment.
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.11.001
167-6296/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.resulting earnings for medical professionals are “correct”. One way
to assess the correctness of earnings of medical professionals is to
compare their earnings with what the same workers would have
earned in alternative professions. This is for example the question
that researchers try to answer when calculating the public-private
wage gap (e.g. Bradley et al., 2017; Hartog and Oosterbeek,
1993).
In this study we focus on dentists in the Netherlands and try
to answer the question how much more dentists earn compared
to what the same people could have earned in another profes-
sion. To do so, we  take advantage of the fact that in the years
1991–1999, there were always more applicants for dental schools
in the Netherlands than available places and that a lottery deter-
mined which applicants were admitted. In this design, losers of
the admission lotteries serve as comparison group. This creates an
arguably more convincing comparison group than is usually the
case when earnings are compared across different occupations or
sectors. In those cases identification is typically based on a condi-
tional independence assumption.
Combining data on results of the admission lotteries with data
on later earnings allows us to estimate the causal effect of studying
dentistry on earnings. In addition to earnings outcomes, we also



























































applicants are allowed to reapply in the next year, and until 1999
they could do this as often as they wanted.8 We  observe that 65%
of the rejected first-time applicants reapply at least once.946 N. Ketel et al. / Journal of Hea
ffects working hours, human capital investments and private-life
utcomes.
We are not the first to relate the earnings of dentists to lim-
ted supply and contribute to a broader literature on occupational
icensing (for example Kleiner, 2000) and one on dentistry in partic-
lar. In an early study, Shepard (1978) compares prices for dental
ervices and mean dentists’ income between thirty-five states in
he US that restricted licensing of out-of-state dentists and fif-
een states having reciprocity agreements recognizing each other’s
icenses. He finds that prices and incomes are 12–15% higher in
he non-reciprocity states (p.200). Using a more refined measure
f states’ strictness in licensing, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) confirm
hepard’s results with respect to prices of dental services and mean
entists’ income. In addition, they find no evidence that stricter
icensing influences the quality of dental services.2,3
Our paper also contributes to the recently emerging literature
hat examines payoffs to specific fields of study (e.g. Hastings et al.,
013; Grosz, 2016; Ketel et al., 2016 and Kirkebøen et al., 2016; see
lso: Altonji et al., 2012, 2016). Most related is our previous paper
Ketel et al., 2016) where we use admission lotteries to estimate the
nancial payoffs to completing medical school in the Netherlands.
here we find that in every year after graduation doctors earn at
east 20% more than similar applicants who end up in their next-
est profession.4
Almost immediately after graduation the annual gross income
f people who studied dentistry is on average 50,000 Euros higher
han what they would have earned in their next-best field of study.
his amounts to a premium of 63%. We  have information up to
2 years after students’ first application to study dentistry and
nd that the annual gain is fairly stable over this period and is
riven by income generated from self employment. We  do not find
hat dentists work longer hours, incur larger investments during
heir studies in terms of forgone earnings and direct expenses, or
ake larger sacrifices in private-life outcomes. Given that there are
bout twice as many applicants than available places also speaks
gainst the explanation that the high payoffs compensate for other
nattractive features of the work as such a compensation should
nly make the marginal dentist indifferent.
One plausible explanation for the high payoffs for dentists is
hat they earn a monopoly rent due to the limited supply. To inves-
igate this further we regressed earnings of dentists on the relative
upply of dentists in local labor markets controlling for region and
ear fixed effects. Consistent with the monopoly rent explanation
e find that dentist’s earnings decrease with dentist density. Also
he fact that the supply of dentists in the Netherlands is lower
han in most other countries, and that payoffs are equally high
or low-GPA dentists as for high-GPA dentists are consistent with
ents explaining the high returns. Other potential explanations for
he high payoffs are supplier-induced demand due to asymmet-
ic information between dentists and patients, and comparative
dvantage where dentists possess a unique bundle of skills that
akes them very productive as dentists but not very productive
lsewhere. Our research design does not allow us to disentangle
etween the supplier-induced demand, the comparative advantage
nd the monopoly-rent explanations.
2 The estimates reported by Shepard (1978) and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) can
est  be interpreted as associations rather than as causal effects. Neither paper points
o  an exogenous source of variation in states’ strictness in licensing, nor do they use
 difference-in-differences approach.
3 Grytten and Sørensen (2000) analyze the dental market in Norway – a country
here the supply of dentists is almost twice as large as in the Netherlands – and
nd  no support for Norwegian dentists earning monopoly rents.
4 We compare the findings from the previous study and the current one in detail
n  Section 6.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion provides further details about the institutional context and the
admission lottery to the study of dentistry. Section 3 describes the
data used in this paper. Section 4 discusses the empirical model and
the identification. Section 5 presents the main results, while Section
6 assesses the heterogeneity of treatment effects between men  and
women and by high school GPA. In that section, we  also compare
the payoffs of completing dentistry to the payoffs of completing
medical school. Section 7 discusses possible reasons for the large
earnings premium. We consider working hours, costs of studying,
compensating differentials, comparative advantage and monopoly
rents. Section 8 concludes and discusses the implications of our
findings.
2. Background and institutional context
2.1. Studying dentistry in the Netherlands
High school graduates in the Netherlands who  complete the aca-
demic track are eligible for university studies in all fields of study
and institutions.5 Students choose their field of study as soon as
they enter university, unlike, for example, in the US where stu-
dents specialize later. For the large majority of fields, universities
have to accept all applicants but some fields have quotas that limit
the number of students that are admitted. Dentistry is one of the
studies with a quota.6
Following the rapid expansion of university enrollment in the
1970s, the Dutch Minister of Education has since 1972 the possibil-
ity to limit the number of students admitted to specific university
studies through quotas. A quota can be based on capacity con-
straints of the universities and on labor market considerations. An
important input for the determination of the quota for dentistry are
negotiations between the Ministry of Health and the professional
association of dentists. This association may  protect the labor mar-
ket position of the current dentists, which can result in conservative
forecasts of the future demand for dentists. For the cohorts of appli-
cants that we consider in this paper (1991–1999), the annual quota
increased from 142 in 1991 to 216 in 1999, and was on average 180
students.
Until the year 2000, students who  applied to a study with a
quota were admitted on the basis of the results from a (nation-
wide) centralized lottery.7 Admission lotteries to dental schools
(and other oversubscribed studies) were originally introduced to
promote equality of opportunity in higher education. It was thought
that this would not be achieved to the same degree by admis-
sion on high school GPA when able students from less-advantaged
backgrounds have fewer resources to prepare for exams. Rejected5 Dutch schoolchildren are tracked into different levels around the age 12 when
they enter secondary school. The academic track is the highest track. Around 20% of
all  students complete this track.
6 Other university studies that have quotas are medical school, veterinary
medicine and (in some years) international business studies. In Ketel et al. (2016)
we exploit the quota for medical school.
7 Since 2000, dental schools are allowed to admit at most 50% of the students
using their own criteria. The schools have made increasing use of this. Selection is
often based on motivation and previous experience. For this reason we restrict our
analysis to students who first applied to dentistry before this change.
8 In our data, the maximum number of applications of one individual is five. Since
1999, the maximum number of applications is limited to three.
9 Alternatively, lottery losers can decide to study dentistry abroad. Below we
present evidence indicating that the share of lottery losers enrolling in a school
abroad is at most very small.
N. Ketel et al. / Journal of Health Ec
Table  1
Lottery categories.
Category High school GPA Share Weight
A GPA ≥ 8.5 0.003 2.00
B  8.0 ≤ GPA < 8.5 0.019 1.50
C  7.5 ≤ GPA < 8.0 0.035 1.25
D  7.0 ≤ GPA < 7.5 0.138 1.00
E  6.5 ≤ GPA < 7.0 0.217 0.80
F  GPA < 6.5 0.400 0.67
Other – 0.187 1.00
Note: GPA is grade point average on the final exams in high school. Share is the
share of applicants in the different categories that applied for the lotteries in the
years 1991–1999. Weight indicates the relative probability of being admitted. The
category “Other” refers to students who did not participate in the nationwide high-



























Fig. 1. Probability of being admitted by year of application.
The nationwide admission lottery is weighted such that stu-
ents with a higher GPA on their high-school exam have a higher
robability to be admitted.10 High-school exams are nationwide
nd externally graded on a scale from one to ten, where six and
bove indicates a pass. Table 1 shows which GPA intervals are
ssigned to the different lottery categories – labeled A to F –
ogether with the shares of applicants in each category. The cat-
gory “Other” refers to students who did not attend high school
n the Netherlands and therefore did not participate in the high-
chool exams, such as foreign students. The final column indicates
he weights of the different categories in the lottery. The total num-
er of available places are divided over categories A to F such that for
he number of available places divided by the number of applicants
n a category, the weights as in Table 1 hold.11Fig. 1 shows the admission rates per year by lottery category.12
n the early years all applicants are admitted. From 1991 onwards
he number of applicants exceeds the quota, although in 1991 and
10 Graduating from high school requires an exam in seven subjects including Dutch
nd English. Applicants for dentistry should also have passed biology, chemistry,
hysics and math. Once the exam is passed it cannot be retaken. Applicants can
hus not retake the exam in order to end up in a higher lottery category.




wjNj where wk is the weight given to category k ∈ {A, . . .,  F, Other}, Nk
he number of applicants of category k, and P the total number of places. In case
he  number of available places in a category exceeds the number of applicants, all
pplicants in that category are admitted. For the remaining categories the weights
etween the ratios of available places and the number of applicants per category
emains the same.
12 Table A1 in the appendix contains more detailed information on the admission
robabilities together with the number of applicants per category per year.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158 147
1992 the number of lottery losers is small. The majority of appli-
cants are in categories C to F, for which admission rates decline to
only 31% in 1998. Since applicants can participate in multiple lot-
teries, almost 73% of all persons that applied between 1991 and
1999 are eventually admitted.13
The admission lottery is centrally administered and executed.
Participants in the admission lotteries can list their preferred
schools. Applicants’ ranking of schools does not affect the out-
come of the lottery. Once the result from the lottery is known,
the admitted students are assigned to the schools while taking
their preferences into account where possible. For the lottery years
1991–1999, 84% of the lottery winners got a place at their first-
ranked university. In the Netherlands, dentistry is offered by four
universities: two in Amsterdam, one in Groningen and one in
Nijmegen. The study programs for dentistry at these universities
are similar in content and quality. One reason why quality differ-
ences are small is that all Dutch universities are publicly funded and
that tuition fees are low and the same for all universities (and fields
of study). Consistent with the similarity of the dentistry program
at different universities, there are only small differences in the GPA
of the students that list different schools as their most preferred
school.
Until 2007, the study of dentistry in the Netherlands had a nom-
inal duration of five years and after finishing, graduates can start
practicing as a dentist. A small share (8.8% in our data) of the
graduates from the study of dentistry specialize as oral surgeon
or orthodontist.
2.2. The market for dental services in the Netherlands
There are around 8000 practicing dentists in the Netherlands.14
All of them are university-educated dentists who  are registered by
the government.
Dental practices in the Netherlands are private; there are no
state practices. The typical practice is small, with one dentist and
one assistant. In the larger cities some practices are larger, con-
sisting of several dentists, assistants and dental hygienists. Oral
surgeons are mostly affiliated with a hospital and orthodontists
mostly run a private practice. Patients are referred to these special-
ists by their regular dentists. A growing number of Dutch dentists
employ the services of a dental hygienist, and in the larger cities
particularly, there are also separate dental hygienist practices.
Many Dutch inhabitants attend their dentists once or twice a
year for regular check-ups. Patients are responsible for the pay-
ment of their treatment costs. For children under age 18, dental care
costs are covered by the basic health insurance which is compulsory
for all citizens. Adults can insure for dental care by supplementary
insurance packages. These packages can cover up to 75% of costs,
but they are subject to caps which limit the amount that is cov-
ered by the insurance. Only 45% of people in the Netherlands buy
supplementary dental insurance. Godfried et al. (2001) report evi-
dence of adverse selection into supplementary dental insurance in
the Netherlands.
On behalf of the government, the Dutch Health Care Authority
sets maximum rates for all dental treatments, where treatments are
described in uniform codes. All Dutch dentists must adhere to these
codes. The maximum rates result from negotiations between the
Health Care Authority and the professional association of dentists.
13 In 1999 a reform was implemented which implied that applicants with a GPA
above eight (category A and B) are automatically admitted. The weights for the other
categories remained the same.
14 Information in this subsection is partly based on Rietrae (2016).

























































Balancing of personal characteristics by admission status of the first lottery
application.
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-Value
Female 0.49 0.49 0.50
Age  at first application 18.9 18.8 0.68
Non-western immigrant 0.09 0.11 0.51
Number of individuals 1,180 1,120
Note: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities
for students in different years of application.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics by admission status of the first lottery application.
Lottery winners Lottery losers
Study enrollment and
completion
Enrolled in dentistry 0.91 0.42
Completed dentistry 0.77 0.39
Licensed as dentist 0.77 0.41
Enrolled in study program in
the Netherlands
0.99 0.96











Children (yes/no) 0.74 0.71
Number of children 1.59 1.49
Number of individuals 1,180 1,120
Note: Since the lottery is weighted we have weighted observations by the inverse
probability of winning the lottery for each lottery category/lottery year combination
to allow for a causal interpretation of the differences between the columns. For the48 N. Ketel et al. / Journal of Hea
. Data
.1. Data sources and sample
Our data come from several sources. The first source is
he administrative registry of the agency (DUO) that conducts
he admission lotteries and also registers enrollment and study
rogress of all Dutch students in higher education. These data con-
ain all applicants for the study of dentistry, their lottery category
but not their exact GPA) and the outcomes of the lotteries. Fur-
hermore, from the enrollment registry we obtain the actual study
hoices of both winning and losing lottery applicants. Informa-
ion on study progress is available as the agency registers when
nd whether students successfully complete certain stages of their
tudies.15
We  exclude all applicants who applied for the first time after
999 because from the year 2000 onwards dental schools can admit
p to 50% of their students using their own criteria. We  also exclude
pplicants in lottery category/lottery year combinations for which
he probability of winning the lottery is equal to one.16 This leaves
s with a sample of 2309 persons.
Using social security numbers, the lottery and enrollment infor-
ation from DUO is merged to individual administrative records of
ll Dutch citizens kept by Statistics Netherlands (we  lose 9 obser-
ations without a valid social security number, reducing the final
ample to 2300 observations). The data of Statistics Netherlands
nclude information from municipalities, tax authorities and social
nsurance administrations. This includes detailed information on
arnings from various sources, labor supply and individual char-
cteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity and marital status. All
nhabitants of the Netherlands are registered at a municipality,
hich means that if a person is not in our data in a particular
ear, this person did not live in the Netherlands in that year. Data
rom Statistics Netherlands cover the years 1999–2015. Statistics
etherlands also has records from the so-called BIG-register which
ncludes all health-care professionals in the Netherlands, which can
e linked. This register provides information regarding individual
ualifications and entitlement to practice. From this register we
now whether someone is licensed as a dentist.
For self-employed workers, the administrative records from
tatistics Netherlands contain no information on working hours.
ince the majority of the dentists are self-employed, we  cannot
ompare working hours and hourly wages between winners and
osers of the first lottery. To examine whether the large income
ayoff to the study of dentistry we find below, is due to long work-
ng hours, we use information from the research project “Study
 Work” which is based on an annual survey among people who
ecently finished their studies and entered the labor market. The
ata have been collected by SEO Amsterdam Economics for each
ear from 1997 to 2015. The survey asks which field of study some-
ne completed and also whether someone ever participated in an
dmission lottery and if so, for which field of study. A disadvan-
age of the survey is that the answers cannot be linked to the other
dministrative data, but the survey has the advantage that it con-
ains information about working hours, both for employees and for
elf-employed workers.15 Information on lottery participation is available from 1987 to 2004. The avail-
bility of the years 1987—1990 allows us to establish first lottery participation in
991. The study enrollment registry runs from 1987 to 2004, and is augmented
sing information on attended/completed education from Statistics Netherlands
containing information up to 2016).
16 This applies to category A for all years, and to category B/C/D for some lottery
ears, see Table A1.outcomes self-employed, married and children we take the outcome in the last year
that we observe the individual in the registry (for 94% of the individuals this is the
year 2015). At this point in time the individuals are on average 39 years old.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the balancing of the available pre-treatment
characteristics between winners and losers of their first lottery.17
We  show the sample means of the individual characteristics and
report the p-value for equality obtained from regressing this
characteristic on a dummy  for winning the lottery and the full
interaction of year of lottery fixed effects and lottery category fixed
effects. Each p-value comes from a separate regression. About 49%
of the applicants are female, the average age at the first application
is 18.8, and around 10% of the sample are from non-western origin.
The p-values raise no concern about the randomness of the admis-
sion lotteries. This is consistent with the fact there has never been a
case where someone questioned the fairness of the admission lot-
tery for dental school or any other study with admission lotteries
in the Netherlands.
Table 3 presents summary statistics on study achievement and
labor market outcomes by result of the first lottery. Lottery losers
have, on average, a lower GPA on the secondary school exams,
which follows mechanically from the GPA-weighted lottery. There-
fore, the results in Table 3 are weighted to allow for a comparison
between the lottery winners and losers.18 The result of the first lot-
17 When there can be no confusion we sometimes refer to winners and losers of
their first lottery as “lottery winners” and “lottery losers”.
18 Specifically, we have used the inverse of the probability of winning the lottery


























































our results in terms of completion because it is the more interest-
ing endogenous variable from the perspective of labor markets ofN. Ketel et al. / Journal of Hea
ery is associated with an almost 50 percentage points increase in
nrollment into dentistry. Not everyone who wins the first lottery
ctually enrolls in dentistry; 9% do not. Among the losers of the first
ottery, almost 42% end up enrolling for dentistry (after winning a
ubsequent lottery). Of the winners 77% complete the study of den-
istry, compared to 39% for the losers. Finally, almost all individuals
ho complete dentistry also register as a dentist, and are therefore
icensed. The small difference between completion and registra-
ion rates may  be caused by the fact that registration by definition
an only be done after graduation. Additionally, for lottery losers it
ight be that some individuals obtained a dental degree abroad and
fterwards registered as a dentist in the Netherlands. In the anal-
ses these individuals are treated as non-completers of the study
f dentistry. This is likely to bias the estimates of the payoffs to
entistry slightly downwards.
For the interpretation of the estimated payoffs to dental school it
s important to know which alternatives the lottery losers choose.
ost lottery losers attend a study program in the Netherlands.19
nly 4% of the lottery losers never register for higher education in
he Netherlands. These individuals may  not have enrolled in any
tudy program or may  have studied abroad. Of the lottery partici-
ants that do not enroll in dentistry but do enroll in Dutch higher
ducation 33% enroll in a health-related field (8% in medical school).
ther fields that are frequently chosen are Economics and Law
28%), Science and Engineering (19%) and Social Sciences, Human-
ties and Education (16%). Almost all lottery participants complete
 study program in the Netherlands.
Table 3 also shows the means of earnings. Earnings are mea-
ured as the sum of before-tax income from employment, income
rom self-employment, income from abroad and other income
rom labor. Earnings are observed annually for all residents in the
etherlands. All amounts are corrected for the average wage devel-
pment of university graduates over the observation period and
xpressed to constant 2015 Euros. Table 3 shows that earnings are,
n average, around 35% higher for winners than for losers. Of the
inners, 61% are self-employed compared to 40% for lottery losers.
Finally, the bottom part of the table shows descriptive statistics
or family outcomes in the last year that an individual is observed
2015 for 94% of the sample). Winners of the lottery are more likely
o be married or have a partner and to have children.
. Empirical approach
To estimate the payoff to dentistry we apply the same empirical
pproach as in Ketel et al. (2016). We  assume a linear relation-
hip between the labor market outcome of individual i in year t
ho applied for the first time to study dentistry in year  (Yit) and
aving completed dentistry (Di):
it = ˛t + t− + ıt−Di + Xiˇt− + LCi + Uit (1)
here t −  indicates the number of years elapsed between the year
f the first lottery and the year in which the outcome is observed.
i is a vector of controls including gender, ethnicity and age at first
ottery, and LCi is the interaction between lottery category and year
f first lottery. ˛t and  t− are fixed effects for the year in which
he outcome is observed and the number of years since the first
pplication. Uit is the error term. The parameters of interest are
t− which describe the payoffs to completing dentistry t −  years
fter first applying. We  estimate Eq. (1) separately for 0 to 22 years
ince the first lottery participation.
act that among the lottery winners (losers) applicants in de higher lottery categories
re overrepresented (underrepresented).
19 Recall that enrollment for almost all study programs in the Netherlands is unlim-
ted  and unrestricted.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158 149
If highly motivated students self-select into dentistry, the OLS
estimator of ıt− will be biased. The lottery seems to solve this prob-
lem, but completing dentistry remains potentially endogenous. Not
all admitted students actually enroll and complete dentistry, and
lottery losers often reapply in subsequent years. Therefore, we
instrument Di with the result (0/1) of the first lottery (LR1i) in which
individual i participated. We  estimate a first-stage equation of the
form:
Di = t− + t−LR1i + Xit− + LCi + Vit− (2)
The identifying assumption is that conditional on Xi and LCi the
result in the first lottery is mean independent of Uit : E[Uit |Xi, LCi ,
LR1i] = E[Uit |Xi, LCi]. Recall from above that individuals who are in
the same year in the same lottery category, have the same probabil-
ity to be admitted. This conditional random assignment guarantees
that the conditional mean independence assumption holds.
In Eq. (2) the parameter t− reflects the difference in com-
pletion rates between winners and losers of the first lottery.20 An
interpretation of t− is that it describes the fraction of compliers in
the data, which are applicants for whom completion of the study of
dentistry is determined by the result of the first lottery.21 By esti-
mating Eq. (1) separately for each number of years after the first
lottery, we  estimate how the earnings payoff develops during the
first 22 years after the first lottery. This period captures the poten-
tially longer study duration of dentistry compared to alternative
studies, and thereby provides an estimate of the opportunity costs
of the longer investment in schooling.
In the above we  framed the analysis in terms of the effects of
completion of dental school. Alternatively, it is possible to con-
sider enrollment in dental school (or being licensed as dentist) as
the endogenous variable of interest. The instrumental variable esti-
mates for completion and enrollment are quite similar because the
first-stage estimates are not too different. The first-stage estimate
of the effect of winning the first lottery on completion dental school
equals around 0.41 while the first-stage estimate of the effect of
winning the first lottery on enrolling in dental school is around
0.51. Replacing completion by enrollment as endogenous variable
of interest will therefore lower the IV estimates by around 20%
(1 − 0.410.51 ).
The choice of enrollment or completion as the endogenous vari-
able has implications for the exclusion restriction needed for a
causal interpretation. Altonji et al. (2016) discuss the difference
between the two exclusion restrictions in case a substantial share
of those who  enroll do not complete. With enrollment as the
endogenous variable, these applicants contribute to the estimates
of winning compliers, whereas with completion as the endogenous
variable, these applicants end up in the group of never takers. If
dropouts from dental school are disappointed and therefore have
worse labor market outcomes, the result of the first lottery (the
instrument) has an impact on earnings independent of comple-
tion (but not of enrollment). Given that the share of dropouts from
dental school is not substantial (see Table 3) we prefer to discussmedical professionals.
20 Because we perform separate regressions for the number of years since the first
lottery, we  estimate a separate  for each value of t − .
21 Hence, compliers are applicants who  complete dentistry after winning the first
lottery and do not complete dentistry after losing the first lottery. Note that the
latter may  also be the result of losing the first lottery, participate in a second (or
higher) lottery and also lose that lottery.
150 N. Ketel et al. / Journal of Health Economics 63 (2019) 145–158
Table 4
Instrumental variable estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on earnings t −  years after first applying.
t −  N First stage Earnings (×D 1000) Log(Earnings) I[Earnings = 0]
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 288 0.31 (0.06)*** −1.9 (0.9)** −0.60 (0.51) 0.23 (0.16)
1  601 0.38 (0.04)*** −3.5 (0.8)*** −1.22 (0.30)*** 0.19 (0.10)*
2 949 0.40 (0.03)*** −1.8 (0.6)*** −0.21 (0.22) 0.16 (0.07)**
3 1216 0.41 (0.03)*** −2.3 (0.6)*** −0.68 (0.18)*** 0.01 (0.06)
4  1502 0.40 (0.02)*** −2.4 (0.8)*** −0.56 (0.18)*** 0.00 (0.05)
5  1817 0.41 (0.02)*** −3.0 (1.1)*** −0.17 (0.17) 0.14 (0.05)***
6 2020 0.41 (0.02)*** 25.0 (3.0)*** 1.08 (0.18)*** −0.07 (0.04)
7  2152 0.41 (0.02)*** 48.3 (4.3)*** 1.43 (0.16)*** −0.07 (0.04)**
8 2267 0.41 (0.02)*** 50.2 (4.5)*** 1.35 (0.14)*** 0.02 (0.03)
9  2253 0.40 (0.02)*** 48.5 (5.1)*** 0.89 (0.11)*** −0.03 (0.03)
10  2241 0.40 (0.02)*** 47.6 (5.3)*** 0.75 (0.09)*** −0.03 (0.02)
11  2232 0.40 (0.02)*** 51.4 (6.0)*** 0.67 (0.09)*** −0.04 (0.02)*
12 2221 0.40 (0.02)*** 51.6 (6.0)*** 0.67 (0.08)*** −0.01 (0.02)
13  2210 0.40 (0.02)*** 47.9 (6.2)*** 0.57 (0.09)*** −0.02 (0.02)
14  2197 0.40 (0.02)*** 54.3 (6.5)*** 0.55 (0.09)*** −0.03 (0.02)
15  2197 0.40 (0.02)*** 57.3 (7.2)*** 0.58 (0.08)*** −0.04 (0.02)**
16 2190 0.40 (0.02)*** 50.2 (6.7)*** 0.44 (0.08)*** −0.04 (0.02)**
17 1914 0.42 (0.02)*** 54.8 (7.1)*** 0.58 (0.08)*** −0.03 (0.02)
18  1619 0.41 (0.03)*** 51.0 (8.6)*** 0.52 (0.09)*** −0.01 (0.03)
19  1284 0.41 (0.03)*** 46.6 (9.7)*** 0.41 (0.11)*** −0.04 (0.03)
20  1022 0.40 (0.03)*** 27.8 (11.8)** 0.34 (0.13)*** −0.06 (0.04)
21  746 0.42 (0.04)*** 27.0 (15.1)* 0.40 (0.17)** −0.05 (0.05)
22  451 0.39 (0.07)*** 45.1 (25.9)* 0.49 (0.24)** −0.13 (0.09)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Total number of individuals is 2,300. Every cell in this table represents a separate regression, which include controls for gender,






























* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
. The payoff to completion of dentistry
Table 4 reports estimates of the effect of completing dentistry
n (log) annual earnings.22 Performing our regressions separately
y number of years after the first lottery (t − ) implies that each
egression uses different subsamples. The second column reports
he number of observations in each regression and shows how
his varies across rows. The first row (t −  = 0) is based on 1999-
arnings information of people who first applied in 1999. The
econd row is based on 2000-earnings information of people who
rst applied in 1999 and on 1999-earnings information of people
ho first applied in 1998, and so on.23
The first-stage regressions describe the effect of winning the
rst lottery on the probability to complete dentistry. The first-stage
stimates in column (3) are highly significant, with the F-statistics
anging from 28 to 391, and are all close to 0.40; winning the first
ottery increases the probability to complete dentistry with around
0 percentage points.24
The fourth column of Table 4 presents the instrumental vari-
ble estimates of the effect of completing dentistry on the level of
nnual earnings (in thousands of Euros). These estimates are also
lotted in Fig. 2. During the first five years after the first lottery,
he payoff to completing the study of dentistry is significantly neg-
tive. During their studies, those who will complete dentistry earn
000–3000 Euros less per year than they would have earned in
heir next-best alternative. This is due to some of the lottery losers
orking full time instead of immediately enrolling in an alterna-
ive study, and to some lottery losers who enrolled in an alternative
22 In an online appendix to this paper we present tables and figures using enroll-
ent as the treatment variable.
23 In principle it is possible to extend the analysis to 23 and 24 years after the
rst lottery since we observe lottery losers from 1991 onwards. For these years the
ample sizes get, however, too small.
24 Because the share of lottery winners varies across years (see Fig. 1) and because
he shares of (re)applicants varies somewhat from year to year, the first-stage esti-
ates vary somewhat between the different rows.Fig. 2. Instrumental variable estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on
earnings t −  years after first applying (shaded area is 90% confidence interval).
study having higher earnings from side jobs. The negative payoff
during the first five years captures the foregone earnings of study-
ing dentistry instead of the next-best alternative. Six years after the
first lottery a substantial share of those studying dentistry complete
their studies and enter the labor market. One year later almost all
of those studying dentistry completed their studies. From then on,
the gross annual earning of dentists are on average around 50,000
Euros higher than the gross annual earnings in the next-best alter-
native. This amount stays fairly constant during the subsequent 15
years.25
25 There are strong fluctuations in earnings payoffs 20 years after the first lottery.
In  that period also confidence intervals widen substantially. The reason is that these
payoffs are estimated on only few observations, i.e. only the cohorts of individuals
who  first participated in the lottery in the first few years of our observation period. In
that  period only few individuals lost the lottery and never became dentist. A straight





































Fig. 4. IV estimates of effects of dentistry completion on earnings, by year since first
lottery and gender (shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals).Fig. 3. Predicted counterfactual earnings levels.
The fifth column of Table 4 shows results for the effect of com-
letion of dentistry on the logarithm of earnings, conditional on
aving positive earnings. The observed pattern is very similar to
he pattern for the level of earnings (which includes zeros). During
he first six years after the lottery, dentistry students have lower log
arnings than they would have had in their next-best alternative.
his reverses in the sixth year. Because the amount of the earn-
ngs gap stays relatively stable while the level of earnings in the
ext-best alternative increases over time, the log earnings payoff
ecreases over time from 1.43 after seven years to 0.49 after 22
ears. A log earnings differential of 0.49 implies that earnings as a
entist are 63% above earnings in the next-best alternative.
The final column shows the effect of dental school on the prob-
bility of having no earnings, the extensive margin employment
ffect. This confirms that future dentists are more likely to have
ero earnings while studying than would be the case in their next-
est alternative. From six years after the first lottery onwards all
oint estimates in the final column are negative, and some sig-
ificantly, indicating that dentists are more likely to have positive
arnings than would be the case in their alternative profession.
In Fig. 3 we show the predicted earnings profiles for an average
ndividual with and without completion of dentistry. We  estimate
xpected earnings using
it × Di = ˛t + t− + ı1,t−Di + Xiˇt− + LCi + Uit (3)(4)
here both Di on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) and 1 − Di on the
ight-hand side of Eq. (4) are instrumented using the result of the
rst lottery (LRi). The IV estimate of the effect of D on Y · D gives the
verage potential outcome with treatment (Y1) for compliers, and
he IV estimate of the effect of 1 − D on Y · (1 − D) gives the aver-
ge potential outcome without treatment (Y0) for compliers.26 The
oefficient ı1,t− (ı0,t−) is the estimate of the average potential out-
omes for compliers with (without) completion of dentistry. Fig. 3
hows that annual earnings with and without completion of den-
istry increase with the number of years after the first lottery. The
ifference between the two profiles is fairly constant over time.. Heterogeneous treatment effects
We  now turn to heterogeneity in the payoffs to dentistry. We
rst examine differences between men  and women. Next, we
ine through the estimates between 19 and 22 years after the first lottery falls in the
0% confidence interval.
26 This follows Abadie (2003). In Appendix C we derive these expressions.Fig. 5. Predicted counterfactual earnings levels by gender.
investigate differences by ability as measured by students’ GPA
categories. Finally, we compare the earnings payoffs of dentists
with the earnings payoffs to completion of medical school in the
Netherlands, which we studied in Ketel et al. (2016).
6.1. Gender
Fig. 4 shows the estimated earnings payoffs separately for men
and women.27 During the study period the payoff profiles for men
and women  coincide. In the sixth year after the first lottery the
payoff is larger for women than for men, reflecting that women
usually complete their study faster than men. Between eight and
18 years after the first lottery the payoffs are higher for men  than for
women, and this difference is quite substantial between 12 and 17
years.28 Over the entire period the undiscounted sum of the payoffs
for men  is 164,000 Euros higher than the undiscounted sum of the
payoffs for women; at a discount rate of 5% the difference in favor
of male dentists amounts to 81,000 Euros.Fig. 5 repeats Fig. 3 by showing predicted earnings profiles, but
now for men  and women, separately. This shows that for women –
dentists and non-dentists – the earnings profiles are relatively flat
27 Table A2 in the appendix reports the estimates.
28 If we estimate the IV regressions interacting the dental school dummy with
gender, the difference between men and women is only significantly different from
zero in four out of 22 years.
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dentists/doctors) and wage earnings.
Fig. B3 in the appendix shows that the higher payoffs for dentists
than for doctors are not due to dentists having worse counterfactualottery and lottery category.
rom 10 years after the first lottery onwards. For men  – dentists
nd non-dentists alike – earnings profiles are increasing during a
uch longer period. The increase is steeper for male dentists than
or male non-dentists.
Ten percent of the male dentists specialize as orthodontist or
ral surgeon, for female dentists this share is 7%. This difference
s too small to explain why payoffs for men  are higher than for
omen.
.2. Ability
The lottery assigns applicants with a higher GPA on their high-
chool exams a higher probability to be admitted. This raises
he question of whether there is a difference in earnings gain
etween people with different GPA’s. To examine this, we esti-
ated earnings payoffs by year after first lottery separately for
ottery categories C to F.29 Fig. 6 reports the results. For categories
 and D the estimates in the first years and last years are not very
recise due to small sample sizes.
For most years after finishing the study of dentistry, the annual
ayoffs are not significantly different for applicants from categories
, D, E and F.30 If anything, the payoffs tend to be somewhat higher
or the lower GPA-categories (E and F) than for the higher categories
C and D). Weighted by their sample shares, the sum of undis-
ounted payoffs for applicants from categories C and D is 69,000
uros lower than the undiscounted payoffs for applicants from cat-
gories E and F. At a discount rate of 5% the difference in favor
f dentists from lower GPA categories amounts to 39,000 Euros.
ig. B1 in the appendix indicates that the difference in favor of
ow-GPA applicants results from a combination of low-GPA appli-
ants having higher earnings as dentist than high-GPA applicants
upper graph), and high-GPA applicants (especially from category
) having higher counterfactual earnings than low-GPA applicants
bottom graph). These results give no ground for an admission pol-
cy that favors applicants with higher GPA.
29 Category A is omitted since there are so few lottery losers in this category. Cate-
ory  B has so few applicants that power is lacking to run the analysis separately for
his  category. All estimated coefficients are in Table A3 in the appendix.
30 This follows from an IV regression which interacts the dental school dummy
ith the dummies for the lottery categories.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158
6.3. Comparison with medical school applicants
In Ketel et al. (2016) we  used admission lotteries to estimate the
earnings payoff to completion of medical school in the Netherlands.
In this subsection we compare the results for applicants for den-
tistry with the results for medical school applicants. Table 5
compares characteristics of the two  samples of applicants. Among
applicants for dentistry the share of women is almost 10 percent-
age points lower than among applicants for the female-majority
medical study. The mean of GPA is also lower for prospective den-
tists than for prospective doctors and applicants for dentistry are
on average five months older than applicants for medical school.
Finally, the share of non-western immigrants is somewhat higher
among dentistry applicants than among medical school applicants.
Applicants for dentistry and for medical school also differ
somewhat in the next-best field that rejected compliers choose.
Twenty-eight percent of the rejected compliers for dental school
study economics or law, while this share is only 15% for the rejected
compliers for medical school. Nineteen percent of the rejected com-
pliers for dental school study science or engineering. This share is
25% for the rejected compliers for medical school. Rejected com-
pliers from the two  pools of applicants are equally likely to opt
for another health-related field and to study social and behavioral
sciences.
Fig. 7 shows in a single graph the payoffs to medical school
(in red) and to the study of dentistry (in blue). The payoffs pro-
file for doctors is very different from that of dentists. The first
phase of the medical study takes one year more than the (entire)
study of dentistry. After six year of medical school, doctors special-
ize for another six to nine years. During the specialization phase
doctors earn a salary, which is higher than what they would have
earned in their next-best profession. Because the salary during the
specialization is constant, the payoff for doctors declines between
years 8 to 12. After 12 years medical school students start to fin-
ish their specialization and their payoffs are increasing. Nineteen
years after the first lottery doctors catch up with dentists, and
both groups earn an annual payoff of around 50,000 Euros. Den-
tists can enter self-employment directly after graduating. Doctors
first need to specialize, and their total payoffs only catch up with
those of dentists once a larger share of their income comes from
self-employment. This explanation is confirmed by Fig. B2 in the
appendix, that splits total earnings into profits (for self-employedFig. 7. IV estimates of effects of dentistry versus medical school completion on
earnings, by year since first lottery (shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals).
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Table  5
Characteristics of applicants and graduates of medical school versus dentistry.
Applicants Graduates
Dentistry Medical school p-Value Dentistry Medical school p-Value
Female (%) 49.1 58.4 0.00 50.8 60.4 0.00
GPA  high school exam 6.7 6.9 0.00 6.7 7.0 0.00
Age  at first application 18.8 18.3 0.00 18.7 18.2 0.00
Non-western immigrant (%) 9.6 7.5 0.00 8.2 6.9 0.10
Number of individuals 2,300 25,393 































Incomes of dentists will exceed incomes in second-best occupa-
tions if dentists are compensated for some unattractive feature of
their work. Compensation may  be required for dentistry being moreFig. 8. Working hours per week.
arnings. On the contrary, the counterfactual earnings for dentists
re higher than the counterfactual earnings for doctors. This sug-
ests that the two studies attract different types of applicants.
. Mechanisms
In this section we discuss possible mechanisms for the high pay-
ffs to the study of dentistry. The mechanisms that we consider are
orking hours, investments in schooling, compensating differen-
ials, monopoly rents, supplier-induced demand and comparative
dvantage.
.1. Hours
One reason why dentists earn such high incomes may  be that
hey work long hours. The data from Statistics Netherlands do
ot contain information on working hours for people who are self
mployed. Because a majority of dentists is self employed we can
ot address this issue using the merged register and admission
ottery data. Fortunately, the research project “Study & Work” con-
ucted by SEO Amsterdam Economics, gives relevant information.
This project is based on an annual survey among people who
ecently finished their studies and entered the labor market. Data
ave been collected for each year from 1997 to 2015. The survey
sks which field of study someone completed. This identifies the
espondents who completed the study of dentistry. The survey also
sks whether someone ever participated in an admission lottery
nd if so, for which field of study. This identifies the respondents
ho lost the lottery for dentistry. With regard to working hours,
he survey asks about contract hours (both for employees and for
elf employed) and about practice (actual) hours. Fig. 8 reports the
ean numbers of hours for dentists and for losers of the lottery
or dentistry together with their standard deviations and the num-
ers of observations.31 This is based on pooled data from all waves.
esults are presented for men  and women together and separately
or men  and women.
31 We gratefully acknowledge the help of Paul Bisschop from SEO Amsterdam
conomics for supplying this information.1,372 15,372
lculated using the midpoints of the GPA categories.
The results in the table show that dentists work significantly
fewer hour than respondents who  lost the lottery for dentistry
(and did not become a dentist). In contract hours the difference
is 5.2 hours per week, and for practice hours 5.5 hours per week.
These differences are very similar for men  and for women. The
table also shows that male dentists work around 4 (around 14%)
more hours per week than female dentists. This partly explains why
male dentists earn more than female dentists, and may  also partly
explain why male dentists have a higher payoff (measured in Euros)
to dentistry than female dentists.32
We conclude that differences in working hours cannot explain
the earnings payoff to completing the study of dentistry. If any-
thing, dentists work fewer hours than comparable others. This is
consistent with leisure being a normal good.
7.2. Opportunity cost
After completion of the study of dentistry, winning compliers
possess a different set of knowledge and skills than compliers who
lost the lottery. It is not possible to assess what share of the pay-
off to dentistry should be attributed to the specific knowledge and
skills bundle without detailed information on people’s human cap-
ital. We do, however, have information about the opportunity costs
of the human capital acquisition of dentists. Because we  have esti-
mated effects of studying dentistry on annual earnings starting in
the year of the first lottery, the estimates cover the period that
applicants are enrolled in (dentistry) school.
Inspection of Table 4 and Fig. 2 reveals that winning compliers
have lower annual incomes than losing compliers until five years
after the first lottery, but the differences are modest and completely
wiped out by the substantially higher incomes of winning compli-
ers in later years. The internal rate of return of completion of dental
school equals 62% and the internal rate of return of enrolling in
dental school equals 64%.
Because tuition fees for university in the Netherlands are the
same for all universities and for all fields of study, the payoffs to
dental school cannot be justified by a larger direct investment. The
uniform tuition fees across fields of study imply rather different
tuition subsidies across fields of study. Dental school is among the
fields with a high tuition subsidy.
7.3. Compensating differentials32 The Wage Indicator Survey which is annually collected by the Amsterdam Insti-
tute for Labor Studies (AIAS) also contains information about level of education,
occupation and actual working hours per week. The number of dentists in the pooled
sample that report their working hours is in this dataset only 54. In this data it is not
possible to identify who lost the lottery for dentistry. When we compare dentists
with all others in this dataset who attained a university degree, we find that dentists
work on average 1.5 h less per week than the comparison group (p = 0.068).
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Table 6
Family outcomes.
All Men  Women
Married/partner 0.04 (0.04) 0.12 (0.06)** −0.02 (0.06)
Has  children 0.09 (0.05)* 0.14 (0.07)** 0.03 (0.07)
Number of children 0.28 (0.13)** 0.31 (0.18)* 0.22 (0.18)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Total number of individuals is 2,300
(1,171 men and 1,129 women). Every cell in this column represents a separate
regression, which include controls for gender (in the first column), ethnicity, age
in  the first lottery year, lottery category, year of first lottery and interaction terms
of the year of first lottery and lottery category.













































A final explanation for the high payoffs of dentists is that peo-** p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
npleasant, having less social prestige, or requiring larger sacrifices
n personal life compared to second-best occupations.
The compensation for the unpleasantness of the work should
e so high that it makes the marginal worker with the largest dis-
aste for unpleasant work indifferent between being a dentist and
er second-best occupation. The fact that the number of applicants
or dental schools is about double the number of available training
laces suggests that the actual earnings differential exceeds the
mount that is necessary to make the marginal dentist indifferent.
In the top 100 of most prestigious occupations in the
etherlands, Korsten (2017) ranks dentists at position 17. This
s below some of the medical specialists, surgeon (position 1),
nternist (4), general practitioner (9) and radiologist (11), but above
ther status professions including pharmacist (18), veterinarian
19), Colonel in the army (20) and company doctor (39). Some
ompensation for a lower status than other medical professions
ay  therefore be required. The ranking of dentists is, however, not
o low that it can explain more than a small part of the observed
arnings differential.
To assess whether the high incomes of dentists are a com-
ensating differential for large sacrifices in their personal life, we
stimated the impact of completing dentistry on the probabilities
f being married or having a partner and on having children. Being
ess likely to be married or having a partner and having no or fewer
hildren may  signal restrictions in the possibility to build a family
ife.33 Table 6 reports the results.
The effect of studying dentistry on family outcomes are more
avorable for men  than for women. For women there is no signif-
cant effect on being married or having a partner, while for men
here is a significant 12 percentage points (s.e. 6 percentage points)
ncrease. Completion of dentistry raises the probability to have chil-
ren for men  by 14 percentage points. For women the effect is small
nd insignificant. Completion of dentistry has a positive effect on
he number of children for men, but not for women. Differences
n family outcomes can thus not explain the earnings payoff to
ompletion of the study of dentistry.
Taken together, we conclude that compensating differentials
an at most explain a small part of the payoffs of completing dental
chool in the Netherlands. This is supported by information from
he 2018 ranking of USNews of best-paying jobs and best careers.
entist occupies the ninth position in the best-paying job ranking
nd the second position in the best careers ranking.34 This suggests
hat other features of working as a dentist, such as lack of stress,
oom for advancement and a satisfying work-life balance, are suf-
ciently attractive relative to earnings that it boosts the position of
entists from ninth to second.
33 This assumes that being married or having a partner and having children repre-
ent voluntary choices, while being single or not having children may not.
34 See: https://money.usnews.com/careers/best-jobs/rankings.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158
7.4. Monopoly rents
The previous subsections argue that the high payoffs to com-
pleting the study of dentistry cannot be attributed to long working
hours, larger investments while studying (opportunity costs and
direct costs) or for unpleasant aspects of working as a dentist.
The obvious remaining explanation is that Dutch dentists
are extracting a monopoly rent. The supply of dentists in the
Netherlands is low due to the quota that the Dutch government
sets on the inflow into dental schools. Regulations and language
barriers restrain the supply of foreign doctors. Whether the supply
restrictions results in a monopoly rent depends on the elasticity of
the demand for dentists and on what the equilibrium number of
dentists would have been. The demand for health care services is
considered to be rather inelastic, with price elasticities around −0.2
(e.g. Liu and Chollet, 2006), while the estimates in the final column
of Table 2 indicate that an oversupply of dentists is unlikely. Two
necessary conditions for supply restrictions to lead to monopoly
rents are therefore satisfied.
For tentative support for the presence of monopoly rents, we
can exploit (local and time) variation of dentist density within the
Netherlands. To this end we  construct a variable “dentist density”
which is the number of dentists per 1000 inhabitants per labor mar-
ket region/year.35 Under the assumption that dentists work in the
same region as where they live (we do not have information on
where they hold practice) we can explore whether dentists’ earn-
ings are higher in regions with lower dentist density. Table 7 shows
that this is the case. The results are robust to including fixed effects
for the labor market region (in case wages are generally higher in
the most urban west of the Netherlands). The results are consistent
with the explanation that the level of competition affects dentists’
income. These results should, however, be interpreted with care
because we  do not model dentists’ decisions where to locate.
Overall, while we  have no direct proof of rent extraction, these
results, the low density of dentists in the Netherlands compared to
other countries and the fact that the payoffs are large for all GPA
categories (see Fig. 6) are all in line with the presence of monopoly
rents in the Dutch labor market for dentists.
7.5. Supplier-induced demand
As the study by Gottschalk et al. (2018) indicates, dentists have
an information advantage over their patients which they may
exploit to deliver otherwise unwanted treatments. A part of the
rent extracted by dentists can therefore be due to supplier-induced
demand resulting from asymmetric information. The negative asso-
ciation between dentist density and incomes reported in Table 7
suggests that dentists cannot raise demand in high density areas
enough to fully offset the effect of more competition. However,
dentists in high density areas may  still exploit their information
advantage to partially undo the effect of more competition. This
means that at the national level, we  cannot exclude that an increase
of the supply of dentists could lead to an increase in supplier-
induced demand.ple who  want to be a dentist are very skilled as dentist relative
35 For this analysis we  look at all registered dentists in the Netherlands (in the
labor market age), taken from the registry of health care professionals. There are
40  labor market regions, and we have earnings information for the dentists for the
years 1999–2015. There are on average 0.52 dentists (s.d. 0.27) per 1000 inhabitants
in a labor market region; the values range from 0.26 to 1.66.
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Table  7
Dentist density and dentists’ earnings.
Dependent variable: yearly dentists’ earnings (×1000D )
(1) (2) 3
Dentists per capita (×1000) −44.4 (1.4)*** −21.6 (1.3)*** −20.5 (3.3)***
Observation year fixed effects x x x
Individual controls x x




































IV estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on earnings, by year since first
lottery and gender.
t −  Earnings (×D 1000)
Men  Women
0 −2.7 (1.4)** −1.2 (1.2)
1  −3.8 (1.2)*** −3.3 (1.2)***
2 −2.2 (0.9)** −1.4 (0.7)**
3 −2.6 (0.9)*** −1.7 (0.8)**
4 −1.5 (1.2) −2.7 (0.9)***
5 −1.6 (1.6) −4.2 (1.4)***
6 21.0 (4.0)*** 30.0 (4.5)***
7 50.0 (6.7)*** 49.1 (5.4)***
8 58.4 (7.2)*** 43.6 (5.2)***
9 57.2 (8.3)*** 41.5 (5.7)***
10 53.1 (8.6)*** 42.6 (5.8)***
11 55.9 (9.7)*** 48.8 (6.6)***
12 59.0 (10.0)*** 46.2 (6.4)***
13 59.4 (10.0)*** 38.3 (6.4)***
14 64.3 (10.3)*** 44.7 (7.4)***
15 68.8 (11.5)*** 46.3 (8.2)***
16 67.8 (10.5)*** 31.0 (7.9)***
17 62.2 (11.5)*** 46.8 (8.0)***
18 54.9 (13.8)*** 46.5 (9.3)***
19 38.6 (14.5)*** 57.0 (12.6)***
20 22.8 (19.3) 36.7 (12.3)***
21 35.5 (22.3) 16.0 (21.0)
22 47.0 (44.2) 47.8 (20.2)**
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Every cell in this table represents a




otes: The independent variable is number of dentists per 1000 inhabitants by labo
he  catchment area surrounding it. Standard errors are clustered by individual. Sam
ine  dummies for age and a dummy  for non-western origin.
f how good they are in other fields. This is a case of compara-
ive advantage which occurs if being a dentists requires a specific
ombination of skills that is not so useful elsewhere. Key compe-
encies of dentists are fine motor skills, good communication skills,
atience and working independently. While the same combination
f skills seems also useful in other well-paid medical occupations
uch as surgeon, anesthesiologist and gynecologist, it may  be that
entists lack other skills that these occupations require.
. Conclusion
This paper documents a large earnings payoff to completion of
he study of dentistry in the Netherlands. Applicants who  won the
rst admission lottery and studied dentistry earn from the first year
hat they enter the labor market onwards, 50,000 Euros per year
ore than what they would earn had they lost the first admission
ottery and ended up in their second-best profession.
This large earnings differential cannot be explained by dentists
orking longer hours. On the contrary, dentists work around 14%
ours per week less than people who participated in the lottery for
ental school and lost. We  also find no support that the earnings
ifferentials compensates for larger investments while studying
opportunity costs and direct costs), or for unpleasant aspects of
orking as a dentist.
Our preferred explanation is that Dutch dentists are extracting
 monopoly rent. This explanation is supported by the finding that
entist earnings are lower in local labor markets where the supply
f dentists is larger. The monopoly-rent explanation is also consis-
ent with the fact that low-GPA dentists gain as least as much as
igh-GPA dentists. Alternatively, the high earnings of dentists can
eflect supplier-induced demand resulting from asymmetric infor-
ation or a comparative advantage where dentists have a ratherpecific bundle of skills that can only be put to productive use when
orking as a dentist. In either case, our results imply that earnings
f dentists in the Netherlands are well above what is required to
ttract a sufficient number of qualified dentists.
able A1
raction p admitted and number of applicants N by year and lottery category (A–F).
Year A B C D 
p N p N p N p 
1991 1.00 3 1.00 7 0.95 
1992  1.00 3 1.00 3 1.00 
1993  1.00 5 1.00 8 0.94 
1994  1.00 2 0.75 8 0.75 12 0.55 
1995  1.00 1 0.82 11 0.71 24 0.58 
1996  1.00 3 0.78 18 0.71 21 0.57 
1997  1.00 1 0.60 10 0.55 20 0.51 
1998  0.67 3 0.60 5 0.58 26 0.44 
1999  1.00 2 1.00 12 0.68 19 0.55 
Total  0.92 12 0.81 75 0.70 140 0.60 
otes: In 1999 a reform was implemented which implied that from that year on applicanket region (COROP area). A labor market region is defined as a regional center and
ize: 162,693 observations (11,727 individuals). Individual controls include gender,
Appendix A. Appendix tableslottery category, year of first lottery and interaction terms of the year of first lottery
and  lottery category.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
E F Total
N p N p N p N
21 0.98 43 0.95 74 0.96 148
28 0.96 47 0.94 99 0.96 180
35 0.79 66 0.66 119 0.76 233
65 0.46 98 0.42 171 0.48 356
76 0.46 96 0.42 201 0.49 409
58 0.44 124 0.40 197 0.47 421
79 0.39 136 0.34 233 0.39 479
88 0.32 122 0.31 252 0.35 496
97 0.44 126 0.35 235 0.44 491
547 0.50 858 0.45 1,581 0.51 3,213
ts with a GPA above 8 (category A and B) are automatically admitted.
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Table A3
IV estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on earnings (×D 1000) by year
since first lottery and lottery category.
t −  C  D E F
0 −0.3 (2.3) −3.0 (1.5)** −0.8 (1.9) −2.6 (1.5)*
1 −20.6 (23.8) −3.9 (1.2)*** −0.9 (2.0) −4.5 (1.3)***
2 −2.5 (3.3) −2.3 (1.3)* −0.6 (1.0) −2.6 (1.0)**
3 −2.1 (2.2) −2.6 (1.5)* −1.7 (1.1) −2.1 (1.0)**
4 0.5 (1.9) −3.4 (1.8)* −2.4 (1.2)** −1.9 (1.2)
5  3.9 (4.0) −4.2 (2.3)* −2.2 (2.2) −3.4 (1.6)**
6 74.0 (21.1)*** 26.0 (7.3)*** 32.9 (5.9)*** 16.2 (4.0)***
7 59.7 (22.4)*** 50.1 (8.5)*** 57.6 (8.9)*** 43.1 (6.1)***
8 48.7 (21.8)** 53.1 (8.7)*** 47.6 (9.4)*** 52.6 (6.5)***
9 53.4 (22.5)** 38.6 (10.4)*** 41.5 (9.1)*** 54.6 (7.9)***
10 62.0 (27.8)** 34.3 (12.3)*** 39.0 (9.5)*** 56.6 (7.8)***
11 38.8 (39.0) 35.2 (12.0)*** 50.2 (11.0)*** 60.8 (8.8)***
12 55.8 (22.3)** 40.1 (16.5)** 50.1 (11.1)*** 56.4 (8.5)***
13 36.8 (23.1) 33.7 (16.3)** 50.1 (10.8)*** 51.4 (9.0)***
14 42.5 (20.4)** 38.6 (17.7)** 51.3 (11.7)*** 59.9 (9.2)***
15 43.8 (20.2)** 45.1 (20.5)** 63.6 (13.1)*** 59.3 (9.9)***
16 50.6 (24.7)** 57.6 (19.1)*** 53.5 (12.8)*** 47.0 (9.2)***
17 46.7 (24.3)* 49.9 (19.0)*** 69.2 (13.7)*** 52.6 (10.0)***
18 45.9 (33.9) 49.6 (28.0)* 64.7 (15.9)*** 46.3 (10.9)***
19 87.4 (39.9)** 39.6 (21.9)* 77.6 (24.3)*** 40.4 (11.6)***
20 165.2 (81.3)** 38.3 (21.0)* 16.1 (23.6) 32.3 (17.2)*
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Every cell in this table represents a
separate regression, which include controls for gender, ethnicity, age in the first
lottery year and year of first lottery.* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158
Appendix B. Appendix figuresFig. B1. Predicted counterfactual earnings levels by lottery category.
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Fig. B2. IV estimates of effects of dentistry versus medical school completion on
profits and wages, by year since first lottery.
F
y
ig. B3. Predicted earnings levels of dentistry versus medical school completion, by
ear since first lottery.onomics 63 (2019) 145–158 157
Appendix C. Derivation of Eqs. (3) and (4)
Using the law of total probability we  can write the following
expressions for E[Y · D|Z = 1] and E[Y · D|Z = 0]:
E[Y · D|Z = 1] = E[Y |D = 1, Z = 1]P(D = 1|Z = 1)
+ E[Y · 0|D = 0, Z = 1]P(D = 0|Z = 1)
= E[Y |D = 1, Z = 1]P(D = 1|Z = 1)
= E[Y1|D = 1, Z = 1]P(D = 1|Z = 1)
E[Y · D|Z = 0] = E[Y · 1|D = 1, Z = 0]P(D = 1|Z = 0)
+ E[Y · 0|D = 0, Z = 0]P(D = 0|Z = 0)
= E[Y |D = 1, Z = 0]P(D = 1|Z = 0)
= E[Y1|D = 1, Z = 0]P(D = 1|Z = 0)
= E[Y1|D = 1, Z = 0]P(D = 1|Z = 0)
Note that individuals for whom D = 1, Z = 1 are always-takers
(a) and compliers (c), while those with D = 1, Z = 0 are always-
takers. This means that P(D = 1|Z  = 1) = P(a or c) = P(a) + P(c) and
P(D = 1|Z  = 0) = P(a). Using this, we obtain:
E[Y · D|Z = 1] = E[Y1|D = 1, Z = 1]P(D = 1|Z = 1)
= (E[Y |a]P(a|a or c) + E[Y |c]P(c|a or c))(P(a or c))
= E[Y1|a]P(a) + E[Y1|c]P(c)
E[Y · D|Z = 0] = E[Y1|D = 1, Z = 0]P(D = 1|Z = 0)
= E[Y1|a]P(a)
From Imbens and Angrist (1994) we  know that:
E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 1] = P(c)
which shows that the IV estimate of the effect of D on Y · D gives the
average Y1 for compliers:
E[Y · D|Z = 1] − E[Y · D|Z = 0]




A similar argument shows that the IV estimate of the effect of
1 − D on Y · (1 − D) gives the average Y0 for compliers:
E[Y · (1 − D)|Z = 1] − E[Y · (1 − D)|Z = 0]




These are Eqs. (3) and (4) in Abadie (2003).
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.11.
001.
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